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1 INTRODUCTION: ON GEPPETTO AND THE PINOCCHIOS 
”If politics is regarded as a conflict over whose preferences are to 
prevail in the determination of policy, then the budget records the 
outcome of this struggle,” 
Wildavsky, 1986: 9 (missing reference). 
To quote Wildavsky, budgeting is the life blood of government and in his words, the budget 
provides us with the annals of the great battle for the pieces of the societal pie – or in Lasswell’s 
terms: the political struggle for who gets what, when and how. But much can be said for instead 
referring to both budget and government in plural, as citizens from all walks of life daily are 
confronted with a bewildering array of public authorities enjoying more or less autonomy from their 
respective central governments; therefore, talk of the budget in singular seems ill guided, at best. 
This is surely true of the case under investigation here, Denmark (if not generally Scandinavia), 
where local authorities account for the torso, arms as well as the legs of the welfare state, 
figuratively speaking – and that quite irrespective of how we measure it. But without the head, the 
body is of little use, and this is where the central government enters the picture; in metaphorical 
terms, the structure of the Danish public sector is one of a plethora of more or less autonomous 
Pinocchios, until recent times 282 municipalities and counties but now 103, and one Geppetto, the 
state, with a lot of strings to keep track of, and disentangle if things should go awry1. Such a 
decentralized system presupposes the marriage of two very different logics often at odds with each 
other: that of centrally held macroeconomic responsibility with local autonomy and local 
accountability (Bækgaard and Degn-Pedersen 2007;Blom-Hansen 2000;Friisberg 1984;Klausen and 
Dahler-Larsen 2000;Togeby et al. 2003). But perhaps this view is a bit too starch as the relationship 
between the aforementioned probably better can be understood as complementary opposites: a 
necessary and also beneficial antagonism. Although each depends on the other, their interests and 
concerns are in neither perfect overlap nor mutually exclusive, but rather somewhere in between. 
The discrepancy between these two logics (or lack thereof) is the point that this thesis pivots 
around, as it constitutes the general frame within which the paper’s analysis fall. This brings us to 
the subject matter. 
                                                 
1
 Municipalities are in Danish designated as ‘(primary) communes’ and counties as ‘county 
communes’. I use the former more general term in this paper. 
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As things would have it, the powers at be formally agreed in 2004 on a complete 
remapping of Denmark’s communal landscape, the second of its kind within four decades; and like 
its predecessor reform (which came into effect on 1st April 1970), it has also had local government 
mergers at its centre, cf. Figure 1 below. Both reforms meant a massive reduction in the number of 
municipalities by a factor of between 3 and 5. However, the two differ from each-other in their time 
span in that the first reform’s mergers were carried out in successive rounds from 1962 to 1972 
(Strukturkommissionen 2004), whereas the second reform’s mergers were implemented at a single 
point in time, namely 1st January 2007. 
 
Notes: the table reports the aggregate number of municipalities in the specified 
years per 1st January with a few exceptions. 
Figure 1: Municipal mergers (aggregate numbers), 1960-2007 
In numerical terms, the second merger reform saw 237 of the 270 existing municipalities (9 
out of 10) merging into 65 new authorities, leaving 33 unaffected and giving a total of 98 new 
municipalities per 1st January 20072. So what was the effect of the second merger reform on the 
municipal economies? There have so far only been a few studies on this question and the lack of 
knowledge is further compounded by the scant scholarly attention that the previous merger reform 
received. 
As illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 2 below, the paper’s mode of enquiry is 
the traditional controlled comparison approach in which any effect of a set of independent factors 
on a set or a single dependent factor is examined with due consideration for contextual factors with 
conditioning or individual explanatory power. The complexity of the municipal economies 
necessitates a multivariate research design consisting of multiple dependent variables. 
                                                 
2
 Furthermore, the 14 counties merged into 5 new regional authorities within the same timeframe. 
However, these are not considered in this paper. 
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Figure 2: Causal core 
As depicted in the left-hand side of Figure 2, the incentives that a merger reform give rise to and 
their duration can for analytical purposes be trisected as expenditures relating firstly to hoarding in 
the merging authorities in the years leading up to the reform with potential longer-term 
consequences; secondly to short-term re-structuring costs in the time before and after the reform; 
and finally to the longer-term adaptation of the service levels within the new amalgam units after 
the mergers (Lundtorp 1999a;Lundtorp 2000;see also Mouritzen 1999). The focus in this paper is 
on the latter aspect: the adaptation of the service levels within the new amalgam units. These 
therefore concern the new municipalities’ financial behaviour in the immediate post-reform year of 
2007. As explicated in later chapters, there are strong theoretical reasons for expecting hikes in 
municipal service provisions, and by implication expenditures, in those new authorities that are 
formed on the basis of mergers; that is, a convergence towards a highest common denominator 
among the merging authorities. As touched upon earlier, the incumbent government and several of 
its predecessors have for a number of years preached as well as practiced fiscal restraint at all levels 
in the public sector, even more so in recent years; this conversely speaks in favour of expecting a 
convergence towards the lowest common denominator. Regardless of these considerations, this 
paper focuses on the reform’s implications for the new authorities’ expenditure levels, be they 
intended, unintended or perhaps unforeseen: 
Question: will the merger reform affect the municipalities’ expenditure levels in the 
immediate post-reform years? 
page 5 of 21 
2 THE ECONOMICS OF GOING INTO BUSINESS 
The financial incentives that a local government merger reform potentially can create need not be 
confined to the period prior to its implementation. Indeed, there can just as easily be equally strong 
incentives in the period after. However having said that, the kind of incentives to be expected in the 
before and the after are not the same. In the previous chapter, an analytical distinction was drawn 
between three types of incentives illustrated in the left-hand side of Figure 2 on page 4 (on this 
distinction, see Lundtorp 1999b;Lundtorp 2000; and Mouritzen 1999), and the issue at hand here is 
the short- and longer-term adaptation (or harmonization) of the service levels in the merging 
municipalities. The incentives relating to the post-reform harmonization of service levels have only 
received scant scholarly attention, at least in Denmark. However, a few studies exist such as Boll 
(1991) who examined the issue descriptively in connection with the 1970 local government reform. 
To the author’s knowledge, only one study has so far examined the issue in connection with the 
2007 reform, namely Jørgensen (2008). (A comprehensive analysis of the near-final amalgam 
groups' structural and financial characteristics is provided by Christoffersen and Ravn-Jonsen; 
2005.) The question at hand pertains to the new, merged municipalities’ service levels in the 
immediate post-reform years. By service level is meant net expenditures in a given policy area, such 
as child care. This definition follows previous studies by Jørgensen (2008) but differs from the oft-
used service level measures in Denmark, which weigh expenditures by expenditure needs (reference 
missing). 
Although adaptation of the service levels is a long-term process, it will in this paper 
only be analyzed in the immediate post-reform year of 2007 after the implementation of the merger 
reform. The reason for this is simply lack of data given that the reform entered into effect only some 
two years ago on 1st January 2007, and information on the municipalities’ actual accounts are at the 
present moment only available for 2007. This is an important restriction as the short- and longer-
term adaptation might very well deviate markedly from each-other: differentiated service provision 
within the amalgam groups along the old municipal lines might be tenable in a short-term 
transitional phase, but this will become intolerable in the longer term. This also means that 
harmonizing the service levels within the amalgam groups is less a matter of choice and more a 
matter of necessity, but perhaps only in the long(er) term. 
A sensible analytical distinction is employed by Nielsen & Pedersen (2006) between a 
mathematical logic and a political logic at work in the process of harmonizing the service levels 
within the amalgam groups. The former logic posits that the level of service provision should be on 
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the arithmetic mean to ensure cost neutrality in the harmonization (Blom-Hansen and Houlberg 
2004a;Kommunernes Landsforening 2005a;Nielsen and Pedersen 2006). Conversely, the latter 
logic posits that political pressures, here in a generic sense, will drive the harmonization upwards or 
downwards to a service level that is not cost neutral. (Both Nielsen & Pedersen as well as Blom-
Hansen & Houlberg align the political logic with only upwards pressures, but this seems 
unnecessarily restrictive as discussed later.) The issue at hand here is simply whether the service 
levels will converge or tend towards the lowest, mean or highest common denominator within each 
of the amalgam groups. Specifically, convergence towards the first- and last-mentioned should 
result in a cost reduction and cost increase respectively. (A fourth base of comparison employed by 
Nielsen & Pedersen (2006) and Kommunernes Landsforening (2005b) is the national mean, and 
this will not be discussed further.) Let us illustrate the difference between these three scenarios by 
way of example cf. Table 1 below. 
    
name  2005 ∆ 
    
    
Haarby (l) 21,682 6,873 
    
Assens  22,441 6,114 
    
Glamsbjerg 
 
22,765 5,790 
    
Vissenbjerg (m) 23,002 5,553 
    
Aarup  23,499 5,056 
    
Tommerup (h) 24,683 3,872 
    
    
wgt. mean (m)  23,089  
    
actual  28,555  
    
sd  930  
    
    
notes: example of service adaptation in the New Assens 
Municipality (new no. 420) based on the merging 
municipalities of Assens (old no. 421), Glamsbjerg (do. 
433), Haarby (do. 437), Tommerup (do. 485), 
Vissenbjerg (do. 491), and Aarup Municipalities (do. 
499). The data reported in the table consists of actual net 
operating expenditures on childcare in 2005 and 2007, 
expressed in DKK in real 2000 prices per client (0 to 10 
year-olds). The data is sorted in ascending order of 
expenditures in 2005 and the table setup is inspired from 
Nielsen & Pedersen (2006) and Kommunernes 
Landsforening (2005c). The three abbreviations in 
parentheses denote lowest (l), mean (m, equal to 23,089 
DKK and approximately placed next to Vissenbjerg) and 
the highest (h) common denominator. Finally, reported 
is also the standard deviation (‘sd’) in the expenditures 
on chilcare in 2005. 
    
Table 1: Service Adaptation in New Assens Municipality on Childcare 
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In the case of New Assens Municipality, the net expenditures on childcare of the six merging 
municipalities in 2005 varies between 21,682 and 24,683 DKK per client (0 to 10 year-old) in real 
2000 prices. These amounts respectively reflect the lowest and highest common denominator in 
service level, and the cost-neutral (weighted) mean equals 23,089 DKK which is quite close to the 
level previously provided in Vissenbjerg Municipality. As it turned out, the service level chosen 
was above even the highest common denominator at 28,555 DKK per client3. The harmonization of 
service levels in this case therefore resulted in a marked increase in expenditures. So what factors 
can contribute to a convergence towards the lowest, mean or highest common denominator in the 
amalgam groups? 
It is useful to situate the discussion of pressures towards the highest common 
denominator within the more general theoretical argument of the so-called asymmetry thesis, in a 
Danish context formulated by Kristensen: he argues that 
“…the forces which support increased public expenditures or resist their reduction 
systematically are stronger than the forces which oppose growth in the public 
expenditures,” 
freely translated from Kristensen (1987). 
This imbalance in support stems from characteristics intrinsic to public activities (in fact most so-
called public goods) whose costs tend to be collective and thus dispersed over the entire taxpaying 
population, whereas their benefits are private and concentrated on a small(er) number of users (see 
also Jørgensen and Mouritzen 2001). This entails that the latter group’s marginal gain from 
increasing expenditures far outweighs the marginal loss incurred by the former group. As 
Christiansen (1990) notes, however, the asymmetry thesis in its original formulation is too general 
and lacks nuance in its expectations (see also Jørgensen and Mouritzen 2001). Instead, he speaks of 
asymmetrical expenditure adaptation (in Danish: ‘asymmetrisk udgiftstilpasning’) which posits that 
                                                 
3
 The weighted mean expenditure level hkE  for amalgam group h on policy area k is defined as 
  
1
i n
hi
i
hk
h
E
E
N
=
=
=
∑
, where  
 hiE  is the total expenditures of municipality i in amalgam group h on  
  policy area k,  
 hN  the total number of clients in amalgam group h, and 
 n is the number of municipalities in amalgam group h. 
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the asymmetry only has an effect when expenditures are reduced. Regardless of this disagreement, 
Blom-Hansen & Houlberg (2004b) forward an argument in the context of a local government 
merger reform which is congruent with the general argument: they expect that the harmonization of 
the service levels will cause a “...permanent lift in expenditures in the municipal world”. As they 
note, 
“[i]n general, it must be expected that the municipal mergers follow an informal rule 
which dictates that no citizens must be in a noticeable poorer situation [after the merger] 
than today. It might sound completely uncontroversial, and even fair, but the 
implication is that the public expenditures will make a tremendous leap upwards. If no 
user-groups are to be made worse off then that requires that the expenditures are 
harmonized at the “highest common denominator” on every expenditure area,” 
freely translated from Blom-Hansen & Houlberg (2004c). 
They introduce a political dimension into their train of thought by stating that 
“[t]he local politicians can simply not bear to explain to the voters that the municipal 
merger which was supposed to make everything better, in fact makes many things 
worse. That is the reason for the reluctance to reduce the lunch programmes in the day 
care centres, shorten the time that the home carers have for the elderly and reduce the 
number of class hours in the schools… If the municipal mergers are not to cause a 
permanent lift in public expenditures and taxes, then it is required that both the national 
politicians are ready to exert tough central control, and that the local politicians are 
willing to pay a very high local political price to ensure that the mergers remain cost 
neutral. We are doubtful as to whether the politicians can sit on their hands. For it is not 
sufficient to control the expenditures in the transitional year. The incentive for 
increasing the service expenditures is permanent,” 
freely translated from Blom-Hansen & Houlberg (2004d).  
Reducing expenditures to ensure cost neutrality (and to adhere to other demands from say the 
central government) can therefore turn out to be a decidedly thorny affair. 
As for pressures towards the lowest common denominator in local service provision, 
none of the previously cited studies mention any such pressures directly. However, there are 
nonetheless several arguments which could lead us to expect the upwards pressures previously 
discussed to be offset or perhaps even reversed: these firstly pertain to central government as both 
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the present incumbent as well as several of its predecessors for a number of years have preached 
and to varying extents also practiced fiscal restraint at all levels in the public sector; and these 
pressured have increased in recent years. Related to these centrally imposed restrictions are 
secondly local pressures towards cost neutrality or perhaps even reductions to offset other costs 
inter alia arising from re-structuring in connection with the local government reform. 
[note: the arguments on pressures towards the lowest common denominator have not been 
developed yet, and focus in the following is on pressures towards the highest common 
denominator.] 
The logic at the group level is that if the merger reform is to have a general expansive 
effect on service provision (because of harmonization at the highest common denominator), then 
there should be a marked difference in the mean change in expenditures from 2005 to 2007 for the 
65 new municipalities based on mergers relative to the remaining 33 authorities. This leads us to the 
first hypothesis on service adaptation (which all are prefixed with 'POST'): 
POST.H1: spatial group differences. It is expected that the change in service provision 
from 2005 to 2007 is higher for the municipalities based on mergers relative to the 
remaining ones (, ceteris paribus). 
(A somewhat similar reasoning is employed by Jørgensen 2008.) The definition of merging iM  is 
defined as 
 
1 merging
0 non-mergingi
M

= 

 
It is worth noting one inherent advantage of analyzing service adaptation by contrasting these two 
groups: the local government reform transferred of tasks to the municipal sector from both the 
counties and the state; and this change is automatically controlled for by contrasting the two groups 
because the addition of tasks arguably affected all municipalities equally. 
The second argument pertains to the variation in expenditure levels among the 
merging municipalities. Specifically, service adaptation should be less of an issue in amalgam 
groups where the expenditure levels were quite homogeneous to begin with, and vice versa. To 
exemplify the argument, consider the case of New Aabenraa Municipality in Table 2 below  along-
side that of New Assens Municipalitiy in Table 1 (on page 6). As we can see, the variation in the 
2005 expenditure levels is markedly higher in the former case with a standard deviation of 3,873 
DKK per client compared to 930 DKK in the latter case. Measured from the viewpoint of the 
highest common denominator, there is a much greater difference to the cost-neutral mean of 6,081 
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DKK per client ( 33,903 27,822− ) in the former compared to 1,594 DKK ( 24,683 23,089− ) in the 
latter. The process of service adaptation is therefore more of an issue in the New Aabeenraa case 
relative to New Assens simply because the initial (2005) expenditure levels vary much more. This 
implies that there is evidence of convergence towards the highest common denominator if we 
observe greater changes in expenditures in those amalgam groups where the initial (2005) 
expenditures vary the most, and vice versa. 
    
Name  2005 ∆ 
    
    
Lundtoft (l) 23,303 11,712 
    
Tinglev  23,709 11,306 
    
Rødekro  25,023 9,992 
    
Bov (m) 26,329 8,686 
    
Aabenraa (h) 33,903 1,112 
    
    
wgt. mean (m)  27,822  
    
actual  35,015  
    
sd  3,873  
    
    
notes: example of service adaptation in the New 
Aabenraa Municipality (new no. 420) based on the 
merging municipalities of Lundtoft (old no. 519), tinglev 
(do. 539), Rødekro (do. 529), Bov (do. 503), and 
Aabenraa (do. 545). The data reported in the table 
consists of actual net operating expenditures on 
childcare in 2005 and 2007, expressed in DKK in real 
2000 prices per client (0 to 10 year-olds). The data is 
sorted in ascending order of expenditures in 2005 and 
the table setup is inspired from Nielsen & Pedersen 
(2006) and Kommunernes Landsforening (2005d). The 
three abbreviations in parentheses denote lowest (l), 
weighted mean (m, equal to 27,822 DKK and 
approximately placed next to Bov) and the highest (h) 
common denominator. Finally, reported is also the 
standard deviation (‘sd’) in the expenditures on chilcare 
in 2005. 
    
Table 2: Service Adaptation in New Aabenraa Municipality on Childcare 
This leads us to the third hypothesis on service adaptation: 
POST.H2: amalgam group variation. It is expected that variation in the 2005 service 
levels is positively related to changes in service provision from 2005 to 2007, so that the 
larger the initial variation the greater the change in provision (, ceteris paribus). 
Specifically, variation is defined as the standard deviation in 2005 expenditure levels within each 
amalgam group. (For the 33 non-merging municipalities, the standard deviation is set to zero.) 
The third factor pertains equally to the group and municipal level (the latter of which 
will be discussed in the next section) and concerns the tractability of policy areas. As Blom-Hansen 
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& Houlberg were cited for earlier, “[t]he local politicians can simply not bear to explain to the 
voters that the municipal merger which was supposed to make everything better, in fact makes 
many things worse”. As Serritslew (2005) similarly notes in the context of budgetary adherence, 
“[w]hen user groups are powerful and constitute a large fraction of the population, it will be more 
difficult for politicians to resist demands for supplementary appropriations”; and whether the local 
politicians are facing harmonization of service levels or the granting of supplementary 
appropriations, the issue remains the same. The pressures towards increasing expenditures in a 
given policy area is dependent firstly on the concentration of benefits in that area; and secondly on 
the potential for organizing the interests of the targeted group of consumers or producers (read: 
employees) in the area to put pressure on the local politicians. (As for the latter distinction, the 
consumer-side is emphasized in the following.) Serritslew provides a nice illustration of each factor 
at work in various policy areas: 
 “Parents of children in schools and child care institutions constitute a well-defined 
group, which is fairly easy to organize. The elderly are harder to mobilize, and 
potentially more resourceful relatives do not necessarily live nearby. The target group 
for public libraries is more heterogeneous, have different interests, and tend to care less. 
The same is true for roads. Unlike countries with large thinly populated areas, no target 
group depends heavily on spending on Danish municipal roads,” 
Serritslew (2005; cursive added). 
An overview of each factor in five policy areas is given in Table 3 below. Firstly, the benefits are 
highly concentrated on well-defined user groups in the areas of childcare, schools and eldercare. 
However, the opposite is the case in the areas of roads and administration as expenditures in these 
areas are not concentrated on any particular subset of the voter population. Secondly, the potential 
for exerting organized pressure on the local politicians more or less follows the same lines, with the 
exception of eldercare where it is harder to organize the interests of the affected users. 
    
policy area concentration  
of benefits 
organized  
pressure tractability 
    
    
childcare yes yes low 
    
schools yes yes low 
    
eldercare yes partly medium 
    
roads no no high 
    
administration no no high 
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sources: based on Serritslew (2005); a more extensive  
typology is provided by Mouritzen (1991). 
    
Table 3: Typology of tractability in five policy areas 
The tractability of a given policy area follows from the joint effect of these two factors: it is 
expected to be very hard and politically costly to impose de facto reductions on service provision in 
areas with low tractability such as childcare and schools; and this entails harmonizing services at 
the highest common denominator in these areas. It is expected to be somewhat easier to carry out 
reductions in the area of eldercare whereas there should be next to no political costs associated with 
reductions in the areas of roads and administration. On the basis of this, the expectation forwarded 
is that 
POST.H3: tractability of policy area. It is expected that the less tractable a policy area 
is, the higher the increase in service provision from 2005 to 2007 in that area and vice 
versa (, ceteris paribus). 
This third hypothesis is not really tested in this paper which only analyzes the service adaptation in 
the childcare area. However, later inclusion of the four other policy areas will make it possible to 
assess the hypothesis. 
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3 CHANGE IN NET EXPENDITURES ON CHILDCARE 
The analysis of the post-reform period is delimited to changes in actual service levels from 2005 to 
2007. The change measure for each policy area k is defined as the change in actual net expenditures 
per client (DKK in real 2000 prices) for municipality i in policy area k from 2005 (denoted time t) 
to 2007 (do. time u): 
 
  
0
1
i iku ikt
ik
i iku hkt
M E E
E
M E E
= −∆ = 
= −
 , where 
(13.1) 
 
   iM  is whether municipality i is based on mergers (1) or not (0), 
    ikuE  is the expenditures per client for municipality i on policy  
  area k in 2007 (time u). 
    iktE  is the corresponding expenditures in 2005 (time t), and 
    hktE  is the weighted average expenditures in amalgam group  
  h on policy area k in 2005 (time t). 
 
The dependent variables on service adaptation in the policy areas are therefore not stock but flow 
measures which gauge not the levels of expenditures but rather the change in them. Note 
furthermore that the 2005 expenditure level for the municipalities based on mergers ( 1iM = ) is 
calculated as the cost-neutral weighted mean in each amalgam group, as defined earlier in footnote 
3 on page 7. This inter alia means that 0ikE∆ =  for an unchanged (cost-neutral) level of 
expenditures in 2007 relative to 2005 for both groups. 
As already noted, the model examines the group mean change in actual 
expenditures on childcare from 2005 to 2007, expressed per client (0 to 10 year-old) in DKK 
(real 2000 prices). This pertains to the first two hypotheses formulated in the previous 
chapter: firstly, POST.H1 posts that the change in service provision on childcare from 2005 to 
2007 is higher for the municipalities based on mergers relative to the remaining ones. 
Secondly, the municipal-level POST.H2 hypothesis stipulates that variation in the initial or 
pre-merger (2005) service levels is positively related to changes in service provision from 
2005 to 2007. The model to be estimated is: 
 0 1 2 3 4i i i i i iCHL CSP OCF M VARβ β β β β ε∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + + +   (13.1) 
 
where 
  iCHL∆  is the change in actual net expenditures on  
 childcare (DKK per client) for municipality i, 
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  0β  is the global or ‘grand’ intercept for all municipalities, 
  kβ is the parameter effect for the kth IV, 1 2, , , kβ β β… , 
  iCSP∆  is change in the number of children aged 0-10 with a single  
 provider for municipality i from 2005 to 2007, 
  iOCF∆  is change in the occupational frequency of females aged  
 16-66 for municipality i from 2005 to 2007, 
  iM  is whether municipality i is based on mergers (1) or not (0), and 
  iVAR  is the within-municipal variation in initial 2005 expenditures  
 for municipality i (set equal to 0 for non-merging  
 authorities), and 
  iε  is the error or residual for municipality i. 
As for the two control variables, the number of children aged 0 to 10 with a single provider 
(in Danish: ‘enlige forsøgere’) is defined as the number of children aged 0 to 10 (both years 
included) with a single mother or father; and the change measure iCSP∆  is defined as the 
actual change in the number of children with a single parent. This measure can be interpreted 
as the additional social expenditures generated by a very specific demographic group. The 
expectation is that iCSP∆  is positively related to childcare expenditures as increases in this 
group of children induce additional costs on the affected municipality. 
Secondly, female occupational frequencies (in Danish: ‘erhvervsfrekvens’) is 
defined as the number women in the labor or workforce (in Danish: ‘arbejdsstyrken’) aged 16 
to 66 years (both years included) in percent of all females aged 16 to 66 years (do.) in the 
municipality; and the change measure iOCF∆  is defined as the actual percentage change from 
2005 to 2007. For example, a value of 2% means that the percentage of women (aged 16 to 
66) in the workforce out of all the women in the municipality (do.), has increased by 2% since 
the preceding year; or stated differently, 2% of the women in the municipality (aged 16 to 66) 
which were not previously in the workforce, have joined since the preceding year. The 
expectation is that iOCF∆  has a positive effect on childcare expenditures per client as 
increases in the percentage of females in the workforce creates additional need for childcare. 
The model is quite limited both temporally and spatially and it is therefore 
estimated as an ordinary regression but with robust standard errors to correct for any potential 
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heteroscedasticity in the error terms iε  (for a general introduction to this topic, see Gujarati 
2003)4. The results are provided in Table 4 below.  
        
MODEL      
     
n 93  2R  .142 
     
p 4  ( )4,88F  ( P F> ) 2.69 (.036) 
     
 
  
       
FIXED kβ  kSEβ   z P z>  95% kCIβ  
         
 
0β  intercept 8,420.985 698.369  12.06 .000 [7,033.124; 9,808.846] 
 
        

1β  itCSP∆  -1.456 2.621  -.56 .580 [-6.664; 3.753] 
        
S 

2β  itOCF∆  -290.175 201.480  -1.44 .153 [-690.575; 110.224] 
 
        
P 3β  iM  -1,409.650 563.002  -2.50 .014 [-2528.498; -290.801] 
 
 
        
 

3β  iVAR  .233 .155  1.50 .136 [-.075; .542] 
 
        
notes: ordinary least-squares regression with robust standard errors using HC3 (on this, see Long 
and Ervin 2000), estimated in STATA using reg with ‘vce(hc3)’ option. Model statistics reported 
include the number of observations (‘n’), the number of estimated fixed parameters (‘p’), the 
coefficient of multiple determination (‘ 2R ’), the model F test (‘F’) and the associated probability 
for the null hypothesis (‘ P F> ’). Fixed parameter statistics are reported in groups respectively 
for the structural (‘S’) and political (‘P’) factors. These include unstandardized beta coefficients 
(‘kβ ’), the associated standard errors (‘kSEβ ’), the coefficient Wald z test statistics (’z’), the 
associated probability for the coefficient null hypotheses (‘ P z> ’), and 95% confidence intervals 
for the unstandardized beta coefficients (‘

95%
k
CIβ ’) 
Table 4: Model CHL.I pooled regression w/HC3, 2005/2007 
The model or omnibus F-test of all coefficients (except the intercept) being simultaneously equal to 
zero, is with a p-value of .036 significant at the 5% level. (When not using robust standard errors, 
the p-value drops to a highly significant .009.) Overall, the model can explain roughly 14% of the 
variation in changes on childcare expenditures. Furthermore, the two control variables are clearly 
insignificant (which also holds if non-robust standard errors are used) and both unexpectedly have 
negative effects on childcare. On the one hand, this indicates that the control variables are 
                                                 
4
 Specifically, the Mackinnon-White HC3 method is employed which is a refinement of the classic 
Huber-White HC0 method. The former is recommended over the latter for sample sizes as small as 
25 observations and in general for sample sizes below 250 observations (Long and Ervin 2000). 
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inappropriate. On the other hand, one can argue that it also indicates that the changes in childcare 
expenditures from 2005 to 2007 have been out of the ordinary and therefore cannot be explained 
using factors which have been found to hold under non-reform circumstances. 
The intercept 0β  reflects the mean change in childcare expenditures from 2005 to 
2007 for the group of municipalities not based on mergers; and this changed by a highly significant 
8.421 DKK per client (0-10 year-old). The differential effect for the municipalities based on 
mergers is significant but unexpectedly negative so that the mean for this group is lower by 1,409 
DKK per client. Specifically, the mean change is calculated as a linear combination Cβ  and is equal 
to 0 1 7,011.335Cβ β β= + =  which with a p-value of .014 is also significantly different from zero. 
Given the coding of the dependent variable, this means that the mean expenditure levels of the 
municipalities based on mergers has increased beyond cost-neutrality by the aforementioned 
amount. On the one hand, this does suggest that service adaptation on average for the entire group 
has tended towards the highest common denominator, or possibly even higher, in the amalgam 
groups. On the other hand, the even larger mean change for the group of unaffected municipalities 
does suggest that the reason(s) for the increases are not related to the merger reform in itself. 
Finally, the variation in initial expenditure levels is with a p-value of .136 somewhat 
close to being significant at the 10% level, and furthermore has the expected positive relationship to 
changes in childcare expenditures. Specifically, an increase in initial 2005 variation of one standard 
deviation is associated with an increase in 2007 childcare expenditures of .233 DKK per client. This 
means that there is some evidence to suggest that the largest increases in childcare expenditures 
beyond the cost-neutral mean have occurred in those amalgam groups where expenditures initially 
varied the most. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, there is firstly no evidence to support hypothesis POST.H1 that the municipalities 
based on mergers at the group level exhibit a greater mean change in childcare expenditures relative 
to the group of unaffected authorities. Secondly, as suggested by POST.H2 there is some evidence 
to suggest that initial variation in expenditure levels is associated with greater changes in childcare 
expenditures. Finally, although POST.H3 has not been directly tested it is disappointing that 
POST.H1 was not verified as this should have been the case in a policy area such as childcare.  
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